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Pladntiffs and Respondmts, , 
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ROBERT H. DAVIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
'• ,.,~ 
Appeal from the Judgment Qf' .. < 
Fourth Judicial District Court m alld W 
State ol. UUlh . ~.:. · 
HONORABLE MAURICE HA.RJDING, 
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ln the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
E. L. GEAR and FERN BATE GEAR, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ROBERT H. DA VIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 10895 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs filed an action upon the theory of tort, ob-
taining money by fraudulent representation. Defendant 
answered that on the 16th day of July, 1965, the defend-
ant was duly adjudged a brulkrupt, under the acts of Con-
gress relating to Bankruptcy, by an Order made and en-
tered in the District Court of the United States for the 
District of Colorado, andl rthe defendant having complied 
with all the requirements of the law in that respect, it was 
thereafter ordeI\..od by said Court discharged from all debts 
and claims prove·able by said Acts against his estate, and 
which existed on the 16th day of July, 1965, on which day 
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the petition for adjudication was filed by the defendant, 
excepting such debts as are by law excepted from the oper-
ation of a discharge in bankruptcy. Defendant claims that 
none of the acts complained of are proved, in law sufficient 
to except the debts sued on from discharge of bankruptcy. 
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT 
The matter was set for trial, and after hearing, the 
Court, sitting without a jucy, found that on April 10, 1964, 
the defendant was made aware of the precarious financial 
situation of the business in which he was engaged and from 
which he would have to look to repay any funds that he 
might borrow; that he did not reveal to the plaintiffs any 
of the circumstances that rendered his situation precarious, 
but kept it concealed from them by active representation 
ooncerning the prosperity and stability of the business and 
his ability to pay any sums iby him; that all sums borrowed 
from the plaintiffs borrowed after such date, totaling $23,-
400.00 were oibtained by fraud, and are excepted from dis-
charge in bankruptcy; that the sum of $3,600.00 is awarded 
as attorney fees in this matter, making a total judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant of $27,· 
000.00. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered 
substantially in conformance with the memorandwn de-
cision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment of the 
Lower Court against Appellant, Robert H. Davis. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That during all times material in tltls action, defendant 
was the president of Mountain Motors, Inc., A Utah Cor-
poration, also knorwn as, Provo Studebaker Company, and 
was the manager and operator of the corporation's Stude-
baker automobile agency in Provo, Utah. 
That plaintiffs loaned to defendalllt the following sums 
of money on or about the dates indicated: 
November 24, 1961. .......... . 
July 15, 1962 ................. . 
July 22, 1963 ................. . 
February 22, 1964. . . . . . . . .... . 
April 14, 1964 ................ . 
May 20, 1964 ................. . 
July 9, 1964 .................. . 
August 11, 1964 .............. . 
$ 5,000.00 
$ 5,200.00 
$ 5,000.00 
$ 4,495.25 
$ 5,000.00 
$ 6,500.00 
$ 6,900.00 
$ 5,000.00 
TOT AL . . . . . . $43,096.25 
That promissory notes were made, executed and deliv-
ered by defendant to the plaintiffs covering ea.ch of said 
loons, and upon at least one occasion, to-wit, on or about 
May 25, 1964, defendant consolidated and renewed the loans 
which were then outstanding by the execution of a new 
promissory note in the amount of $25,000.00, and at that 
time the then outstanding nortes were destroyed. 
11hat at the time of the consolidation in May of 1964, 
whoo defendant was asked for security, defendant informed 
plaintiffs that he had no security to give them but that he 
would obtain a term insurance policy for their protection 
in the event of his deaith. That all of the notes prior to 
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May 20, 1964, given by Mr. Davis to the Gears, were in-
tentionally returned to Mr. Davis and cancelled (R. 52). 
That in addition to the foregoing, plaintiffs purchased 
100 share3 orf capital stock of Mountain Motors, Inc., for 
the sum of $12,500.00 from the defendant herein on or 
about S2pitemb€'r 25, 1963, and pa.id for said stock the sum 
of $7,450.00 by their check and $5,050.00 by cancellation 
of defendant's promissocy norte payable to plaintiffs dated 
July 22, 1963, in the amount of $5,000.00; that on or about 
January 9, 1964, plainitiffs purchased from defendant an 
additional 10 shares of capital stock of Mountain Mortors, 
Inc., and paid therefor the sum of $1,250.00. 
That Rdbert H. Davis ceased being the manager and 
president orf Moun1::ain Motors, Inc., December 7, 1964, at a 
time when the corporation had a net worth of $76,532 (R. 
137). Shortly thereafter in January of 1965, plaintiff, E. 
L. Gear, a Mr. Weight, a Mr. Ross Fazzio, a Mr. Austin 
Ohiles, a Mr. Roxie Childs, and the Olivers commenced 
running Mountain Motor3, Inc. (R. 166). Plaintiffs E. L. 
Gear and Fe:m Bate Gear, husband and wife, continued to 
loan money to the corporation "Mountain Motors" in 1965, 
after defendant, Robert H. Davis, had left the corporation. 
(R. 68). 
That on or about July 16, 1965, defendant was adjudi· 
cated a bankrupt on a petition filed by him in the District 
Court of the United States for the District of Colorado, 
Denver, Colorado; that the indebtedness of defendant to 
plaintiffs referred to above was duly scheduled for dis-
charge; that on or about February 24, 1966, the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado made 
and entered an order discharging defendant from all prove-
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able claims and debts, except debts excepted by the Bank-
ruptcy Aot from the operation of a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. 
That in or about the month of Felbruary, 1964, par-
tially beoause the Studebaker Company had moved its au-
tomobile manufacturing business to Canada, the sales of 
automobiles by Mountain Motors, Inc., dropped from be-
tween 25 to 30 per month to ,about 2 per month; that re-
possessions of previously sold automobiles by Mountain 
Motors during February and March, 1964, increased at an 
unprecedented rate; that on or about April 10, 1964, de~ 
fendant was informed by his accountant and knew that the 
business of Mountain Motors, Inc., had lost approximately 
$22,000.00 in the previous six (6) months. That defend-
ant did not inform plaintiffs of this fact. 
That at no time did plaintiffs ever request a financial 
statement from defendant, and none was given. 
Plaintiffs testified and the court so found that on or 
about April 14, 1964, defendant stated to plaintiffs that he 
wanted to buy the stock of Mountain Motors, Inc., owned 
by Chester and M01bel Oliver; that the business of Moun-
tain Motors was very good, and that it was in sound .finan-
cial condition; that if he owned the stock which was then 
owned by the Olivers he would be able to save Mountain 
Motors, Inc., about $1,300.00 each month since he was 
paying that much to them; that on or about May 20, 1964, 
defendant, in substance and effect, repeated said statement, 
and assured plaintiffs that there was no chance at all of 
losing their money. That on or about July 9, 1964, de-
kndant stated to plaintiffs that he wanted to buy stock 
owned by Ross F·azzio in Mountain Motors, Inc., because 
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Ross Fazzio was demanding equality in the busines.s and 
was interfering with its op2ration. That on or about Au-
gust 11, 1964, defendant stated to plaintiffs that he wan. 
ted to borrow $5,000.00 in order to pay off the back part 
of the property then being occupied by Mountain Motors, 
Inc., and that he would then rent it back to the corporation 
for the sum of $750.00 per month. 
That although plaintiff, E. L. Gear. was a member of 
the Board of Directors of Mountain Motors, Inc., he was 
not notified of any directors meetings and did not attend 
any of said meetings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR TIIE 
COURT TO HOLD THAT AS TO ALL SUMS BORROWED 
BY THE DEFENDANT FROM PLAINTIFFS AFTER 
APRIL 10, 1964, WERE EXCEPTED FROM DISCHlARGE 
IN BANKRUPTCY. 
Plaintiffs complained that on April 14, 1964, May 20, 
1964, and July 9, 1964, defendant made misrepresentations 
as to the financial condition of Mountain Motors, Inc. 
(Amended Complaint paragraph 2 and 3). 
Plaintiffs further complained that on August 11, 1964, 
defendant misrepresented what he intended to do with the 
money borrowed. 
Two issues of law are presented as to the effect of the 
misrepresentation as found by the Court: (1) Does Sec· 
tion 17a(2) of the Bankrupty Act require that false or 
fraudulent statements of financial condition be in writing 
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before the plaintiff can assert this section of 1lhe Act; and 
( 2) d0€S a promise to use money in a particular manner 
constitute fraud if the money is used otherwise? 
(1) Prior to 1960, Section 17a(2) did not include the 
statement conc-erning false financial statements, but Sec-
tion 14c(3) did have this statement. S. Rep. No. 1688, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960) sets out the reasons for mak-
ing the change. It appears that Congress was concerned 
tha·t although the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to 
protect debtors, finance companies were inducing people 
to borrow and in doing so, were requiring tile borrowers 
to fill out financial statements which were tricky and which 
only the most observant could fill out correctly. Then, if 
the debtor subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the creditor 
could object in the bankruptcy court to discharge of this 
obligation by asserting that credit was extended on the 
basis of a false financial statement. 
Therefore, in 1960, Congress changed Section 14c(3) 
so that it applied only to businessmen; however, this opened 
the field too wide, therefore they adopted exactly rthe same 
language into Section 17a(2). This meant, that in fraud 
cases, thee creditor would at least have the possibility of 
bringing an action in the state court (however, the buTden 
of proof \Vould now be shifted to the plaintiff) . This is 
the way the Bankruptcy Act stands today. 
Since 1960 there have been at least three cases decid-
ing the exact issue of whether the statement of financial 
condition had to be written to preclude the defendant from 
asse11:ing discharge: 
(a) Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sofio, 138 So. 2d 616 (3) 
(La. Ct. App. 1963). In this case, the Court said: 
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"The credit manager of plaintiff, testified that he 
asked defendant if he owed any other debits and that 
defendant answer12d that he did not. Defendant denies 
positively that any such que.'::tion was asked of him 
and says that he made no repre.;:·mtation on the sub-
ject. (He did owe other debts.) We are not required 
to re.solve that dispute, for the reason that ·the lang-
uage of the bankruptcy law is explicit in the require-
ment that to prevent the discharge of a debt, the false 
statement by the debtor as to his financial condition 
must be in writing." 
(b) Dial Finance Co. v. Duthu, 188 So. 2d 151 (La. 
Ct. App. 1966). In this case, the court said that even "an 
intent to deceive without a written false [financial] state-
ment will not except the debtor under rthis section of the 
statute." (Id. at 156). 
(c) Friendly Finance Discount Corp. v. Haydn, 171 
So. 2d 717 (La. Ct. App. 1964). The court, in this case, 
held that tllere was discharge under Section 17a(2) even 
though tha-e was a financial statement which was written. 
The reason stated by the court was that plaintiff did not 
rely on the written statement, but rather, on other oral 
statements made by the defendant concerning the defend· 
ant's financial condition, and these statements were not 
set down in writing as required by the statute. 
Also, since 1960, there have been several cases stat· 
ing that the representation of financial condition must be 
in writing, but because there, in fact, were written financial 
statements, the courts •have held that there should be no 
discharge. 
E.: g., Midland Discount Co. v. Robichaux, 184 So.2d 
93 (La Ct. App. 1966), in which the court stated: 
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"Before thor,,,e pertinent provisions of Section 71 can 
prevent the bankrupt from being released by the dis-
charge in bankruptcy, it is ·incumbent upon the plain-
tiff to show that: (1) plaintiff advanced the loan in 
reliance upon a financial statement made by the de-
fendant . . ." (Id. at 96). 
Cash Finance Service, Inc. v. Raisch, 173 So.2d 851 
(La. C~. App. 1965), where the court said: 
"Before the . . . provisions [11 U.S.C. Sec. 35a(2) 
(1964)] can be applicable we deem it incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to show: (1) that plaintiff granted the 
extension or renewal in reliance upon a written finan-
cial statment made by the defendant . . ." (Id. at 
853). 
Household Finance Corp. v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St.2d 
190 214 N.E.2d 667 (1966), in which the court said: 
"A discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve a defend-
ant from liability on his promissory note, where the 
debt for which the note was given was created in reli-
ance upon a materially false statement in writing by 
such defendant for the purpose of obtaining such cre-
dit from plaintiff." 
'I\vo other cases saying generally the same thing are, 
Household Finance Co. v. !De Shazo, 359 P.2d 1044, 1046 
{Wash. 1961); and First Credit Corp. v. Wellnitz, 21 Wis. 
2d 18, 123 N.W.2d 519 (1963). 
Because the language in Section 17a(2) is adopted di-
rectly from Section 14c(3), the construction which has his-
torically applkd to the latter section should now apply 
to Sectioo 17. For an interpretation of the phrase "in 
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writing" see the cases cited ill1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1387, 
n.3 (14th ed. 1966). From these cases, it is obvious fuat 
this section did not give a plaintiff grounds for objection 
to discharge on mere false oral statements of financial con-
dition. The statement had to be written. 
A:s to the alleged false statements made by defendant 
to induce the plaintiffs to act ill1 this case: 
The statement made by Davis to Gears that he wanted 
to buy the stock orf Mountain Motors, Inc., owned by Ches-
ter and Mabel Oliver-; that there was no chance at all of 
losing their money; that he wanted to buy the stock owned 
by Ross Fazzio in Mountain Motors, Inc., because Ross Faz-
zio was demanding equality in rtheir business and was inter· 
fering with its operation; that he wanted to horrmv $5,· 
000.00 in order to pay off the back part of the property 
then being occupied by Mountain Motors, Inc., and that he 
would then rent it back to the corporation for the sum of 
$750.00 per month; are statements of futurity and prom· 
ises. 
The general rule, which is supported by numerous de-
cisions in almost all American and British jurisdictions, is 
that fraud must be related to the present or pre-existing 
fact, and cannot ordinarily be predicated upon 'representa· 
ti.on or statements which involve mere matters of futurity 
or tlrings to be dcne or- performed in the future. See 23 
Am Jur 35:794; 17 A.L.R.2d 1208 (37); 139 P. 986 (44); 
Adamson, et ux. vs. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (49); Marlin 
vs. Drury, 228 P.2d 803 (60); Pace vs. Parrish, 247 P.2d 
273 (63). 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is insufficient to support a 
finding of fraud sufficient to except the debt from the dis-
charge in bankruptcy under Section 17a of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act. Any statement as to financial condition 
must be in writing, and the statements of the defendant in 
this case, other than as to his financial condition, are state-
menrts of futurity and promises not sufficient to except the 
debt from discharge in bankruptcy. 
The judgment should be set aside and judgment en-
tered for defendanrt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY H. IVIE, Esq. 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
